(September 22-30)

The Supreme Court’s temporary restraining order (TRO) that bars President Benigno Aquino III from appointing officers-in-charge for various offices in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and to reset the election here with the national election in 2013 is not the clearest sign that all is lost. The game of the power-that-be takes many forms and faces; some in the most odd and bizarre renditions. One has to recall what happened to the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) in August 2008 in order to understand how the powerful play with power --- and behind the scene.  

(September 15-21)

In an uncharted terrain, a traveller needs a guide or compass to move forward and reach his/her destination. The ongoing GPH-MILF peace negotiation is charted. The way is neatly paved. All what is needed (for the parties) is to be sincere, consistent and follow the guidelines set forth in the “Declaration of Continuity for the Peace Negotiation between the MILF and the GRP” which they signed on June 3, 2010. This agreement, among other matters, tells the parties to look for new formula that would permanently respond to the legitimate aspiration of the Bangsamoro people; in good faith, build on prior consensus points, resolve the legitimate grievances and claims for the people of their identity and origin; reframe the consensus points on ancestral domain; and, above all, proceed and discuss the comprehensive agreement.

(September 8-14)

One who is familiar with the approach the government used against the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) can see so clearly that the 3-in-1 GPH’s proposal is made of the same mold. It is “killing me softly approach” that, like ants, most of our brothers in the MNLF have succumbed to, in which they have no way to disentangle themselves, or the time to do it. The revolutionary or rigorous way to change things comes only once in a lifetime.

(September 1-7)

The MILF had faced many military men across the negotiating table; and it is not true to say that they are not good negotiators. On the contrary, of the four generals already fielded by the government, only Maj. Gen. Edgardo Batenga did not command enough respect from MILF negotiators, because even if government forces had already started attacking Camp Abubakar in April 2000, he still had the gut to deny that the AFP had the order of assault. The other three were Lt. Gen. Fortunato Abat, Maj. Gen. Orlando Soriano, and Lt. Gen. Rodolfo Garcia, whose peace team, despite performing above par, was disowned by the Arroyo administration for alleging arrogating themselves power beyond their mandate.